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Collective Responsibility Gaps

Journal of Business Ethics 2018 97 citations ? Citation count from OpenAlex, updated daily. May differ slightly from the publisher's own count. Score: 40 ? 0–100 AI score estimating relevance to the microplastics field. Papers below 30 are filtered from public browse.
Stéphanie Collins

Summary

This philosophical study develops a framework for distinguishing which types of responsibility — causal, moral, and prospective — can and cannot be meaningfully attributed to three categories of collectives: diffuse, teleological, and agential. Researchers argue that many apparent 'collective responsibility gaps' dissolve on closer analysis for certain collective types and circumstances.

Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective (diffuse, teleological, and agential) and three kinds of responsibility (causal, moral, and prospective). It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps do not exist on closer inspection, at least for some collectives and some of the time.

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